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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The literature on collusion focuses on price-￿xing agreements. Studies of col-
lusion on oligopolistic markets typically assume that ￿rms agree on prices and
production quotas, and studies of collusion in auctions generally model bidding
rings as groups of bidders agreeing on a distribution of bids submitted in the
auction. In this paper, we analyze an alternative form of collusion ￿ market
sharing agreements ￿ which has increasingly attracted the attention of com-
petition authorities. For example, in a recent report, the Irish Competition
Authority (1999) notes:
As an alternative to a price-￿xing cartel, ￿rms can attempt to
achieve the same eﬀect by other means, e.g. they may divide up the
country between them and agree not to sell in each others designated
area, thereby enabling each to set prices knowing that the others will
n o tu n d e r c u tt h e m .A ti t ss i m p l e s t ,amarket-sharing cartel may
be no more than an agreement among ￿rms not to approach each
others customers or not to sell to those in a particular area. This
may involve secretly allocating speci￿c territories to one another or
agreeing on lists of which customers are to be allocated to which
￿rm. Market-sharing agreements may have two aspects. Firstly,
￿rms may decide on the share of the market or level of business that
each is to get. Secondly in order to achieve this objective they may
then get together regularly to decide which ￿rms will get particular
contracts.
The existence of market sharing agreements in oligopolistic markets and
procurement auctions has long been recognized by antitrust authorities1,b u t
evidence suggests that the number of cases involving market sharing agreement
has increased in recent years. With the emergence of the common market, the
European Commission has been particularly aware that producers from diﬀerent
1One of the earliest antitrust cases brought under the Sherman Act, the Addyston Pipe
Case (1898), dealt with a group of six producers of cast iron and water pipes in the Middle
West and the West, which rigged prices quoted to buyers in certain cities, and reserved other
cities as the exclusive domain of one seller. (Scherer and Ross, p. 318).
2countries may enter market sharing agreements to protect their home markets.
In a landmark case against Solvay and ICI, in 1990, the European Commission
has established that the two companies had operated a market sharing agree-
ment for many years by con￿ning their soda-ash activities to their traditional
home markets, namely continental western Europe for Solvay and the United
Kingdom for ICI. It was also found that over many years, all the soda-ash pro-
ducers in Europe accepted and acted upon the ￿home market￿ principle, under
which each producer limited its sales to the country or countries in which it
had established production facilities.2 Very recently, airline alliances have also
become the target of investigation by the European Commission. In July 2001,
the Commission has decided to ￿ne Scandinavian airlines SAS and Maersk Air
39.375 and 13.125 million euros respectively for operating a secret agreement
that led to the monopolization by SAS of the Copenhagen - Stockholm route,
as well as to the sharing of other routes to and from Denmark.3 In the United
States, recent cases of market sharing agreements in procurement auctions are
quoted by Pesendorfer (2000), who provides empirical evidence that in Texas,
contracts for the delivery of milk to school districts operated under a secret mar-
ket sharing agreement. In another recent case, GTE New Media Services has
alleged that Netscape, Yahoo! and the regional telephone companies (RBOCs)
created an illegal cartel designed to exclude GTE from the internet yellow pages
market. In its decision,4 the court noted that the agreement among the RBOCs
to divide the internet yellow pages service along geographic lines could amount
to a per se illegal horizontal market-sharing agreement, violating the Sherman
Act (Maxwell and Reznick, 2001). In Australia, the antitrust authority has
recently brought evidence of market sharing agreements in diﬀerent industries.
In the recyclable waste paper industry, ￿rms agreed to withdraw competitive
quotes to acquire recyclable waste paper in speci￿c areas and allocated cus-
tomers among themselves. In the regional newspapers sector, one publisher
withdrew its plan to extend the coverage of its newspaper to another region
after the incumbent publisher in that region threatened to retaliate. In the
metal recycling industry, large producers employed bullying tactics to intimi-
2See Oﬃcial Journal L 152 , 15/06/1991, pp. 1-15.
3See Press Release - IP/01/1009 - 18.07.2001 of the European Commission.
4GTE New Media Services Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38 (D.D.C. 1998).
3date smaller competitors into market sharing.5
The objective of this paper is to analyze the formation of market sharing
agreements among ￿rms. Do market sharing agreements always lead to the
monopolization of the market? Can groups of ￿rms sign market sharing agree-
ments among themselves but compete on outside markets? When do competing
alliances of ￿rms emerge on the market? Is it possible that two ￿rms sign a
market sharing agreement with a third, but compete against each other? What
are the anti-competitive eﬀects of market sharing agreements, and what is the
socially eﬃcient con￿guration of markets?
In order to answer these questions, we appeal to the recent theory of eco-
nomic networks, developed, among others, by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and
Goyal (1993).6 We consider a model where ￿rms are originally specialized on
one market and compete either as oligopolists or as bidders in a procurement
auction. By signing bilateral agreements, ￿rms can commit to stay out of each
other￿s market. The set of bilateral agreements de￿nes a network of collusive
links, and each ￿rm￿s pro￿t can be expressed as a function of the network. Fol-
lowing Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we characterize the eﬃcient and stable
networks which form on the market.
I nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l ,w ea s s u m et h a t￿rms and markets are symmetric
(there is no entry cost on a foreign market, and all markets have the same
size). Our main result characterizes the set of stable networks, under a minor
restriction on the pro￿t function (we assume that on each market, a ￿rm￿s pro￿t
is log-convex in the number of active ￿rms on the market). We show that a
stable network can be decomposed into complete components of diﬀerent sizes,
all larger than a given lower bound. In economic terms, this result shows that
￿rms form complete alliances (when two ￿rms are linked to a third, they are
also linked to each other), that competing alliances of diﬀerent sizes can emerge,
and that alliances must reach a critical size to be stable. This result stems from
the convexity of pro￿t si nt h en u m b e ro fa c t i v e￿rms on the market. In a
collusive network, all ￿rms have an incentive to free-ride on the market sharing
5See, respectively, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1998, 1999), and
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2000).
6See also Bala and Goyal (2000) and, for a complete survey of the literature, the recent
book by Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001).
4agreements signed by the others: the less ￿rms are active on any given market,
the higher the pro￿to fe v e r y￿rm on that market. However, as pro￿ts are
log-convex, the incentive to sign a market sharing agreement increases with the
number of ￿rms belonging to an alliance. Hence, alliances have to be complete
and must attain a minimal size to be stable. Furthermore, when competing
alliances emerge, they have to be of diﬀerent sizes, with members of the smaller
alliance free-riding on the market sharing agreements signed by the members
of the larger alliance.
We distinguish between two notions of eﬃciency: a network is eﬃcient if
it maximizes total industry pro￿ts and socially eﬃcient if it maximizes social
surplus. As markets are independent, the maximization of total industry prof-
its and social surplus amounts to maximizing total industry pro￿ts and social
surplus on every market. Hence, eﬃcient and socially eﬃcient networks are
characterized by the number of active ￿rms on each market, or alternatively
by the identical number of links of each ￿rm in the network.7 We show that
stable networks are under-connected with respect to eﬃcient networks. In other
words, the free-riding incentives typically prevent ￿rms from reaching the net-
work which maximizes total industry pro￿ts. On the other hand, in all the
applications we consider, it is socially eﬃcient for all ￿rms to be present on all
markets, and stable collusive networks are over-connected with respect to the
socially eﬃcient network.
A distinguishing feature of our analysis is the modelling of collusive links
as bilateral agreements. Bilateralism is also re￿ected in the stability concept of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), who only allow links to be formed and destroyed
on a pairwise basis. Introducing the possibility of multilateral agreements or
coordinated strategies for a ￿rm on diﬀerent markets drastically changes the
characterization of stable networks. We show that when ￿rms can simultane-
ously renege on all their market sharing agreements, the set of stable collusive
networks is seriously reduced. Typically, this stronger stability criterion im-
p o s e sa nu p p e rb o u n do nt h es i z eo fa l l i a n c e s ,a sa￿rm￿s incentive to renege on
all its market sharing agreements is higher for larger alliances.
7In the graph theoretical terminology, these networks are called regular networks.
5We apply our results to speci￿c models of oligopoly and private value auc-
tions. In a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products, diﬀerent speci￿ca-
tions of demand give rise to sharply diﬀerent con￿gurations of stable networks.
In a model with iso-elastic demand, stable networks typically contain only one
very large alliance; in a model with exponential demand, stable con￿gurations
can be fragmented into a large number of small alliances. We also compare
stable networks under Cournot and Bertrand competition in a model with dif-
ferentiated commodities. Not surprisingly, we ￿nd that the incentives to sign
market sharing agreements are higher under price competition than under quan-
tity competition, and that stable alliances are easier to sustain in the Bertrand
model. Finally, we consider private values procurement auctions, and give an
exact characterization of stable networks for diﬀerent distribution functions on
the ￿rms￿ costs. We ￿nd that stable alliances are typically quite large, and that
some stable network con￿gurations allow for the presence of independent ￿rms
which free-ride on the formation of the large alliance. It should be noted that,
in all our applications, when ￿rms can simultaneously destroy all their collu-
sive links, the set of stable alliances is drastically reduced. In fact, in many
examples, no stable alliance survives the stronger criterion of stability.
One of the main defenses of ￿rms involved in market sharing agreements is
the existence of entry costs which naturally prevent ￿rms from entering each
other￿s market. To assess the validity of this argument, we analyze, in an exten-
sion of our baseline model, the formation of market sharing agreements in the
presence of asymmetries. We show that when ￿rms bene￿t from an incumbency
advantage on their home market, their incentive to sign market sharing agree-
ments is strengthened. When foreign ￿rms face a ￿xed entry cost, connected
￿rms form the same number of market sharing agreements, and the collusive
network is typically denser than in the absence of entry costs. However, an
example suggests that, from a social point of view, ￿rms may still be present on
too many markets in the stable collusive network. When foreign ￿rms face unit
transportation costs, the general characterization of stable networks becomes
impossible. In an example, we show that the presence of a transportation cost
increases the number of market sharing agreements, and that some stable col-
lusive networks display incomplete alliances where two ￿rms may be linked to
6a third, but compete among themselves. Finally, we analyze a situation where
markets are asymmetric, and can be ranked by pro￿tability. We show that, in a
stable network, ￿rms on less pro￿table markets sign more market sharing agree-
ments than ￿rms on more pro￿table markets. Again, we provide an example
to show that this may result in the formation of an incomplete alliance, where
two ￿rms with very pro￿t a b l eh o m em a r k e t sc o m p e t ea m o n gt h e m s e l v e sb u t
sign a market sharing agreement with a third ￿rm, located on a less pro￿table
market.
Starting with Stigler (1950)￿s seminal contribution, the stability of price-
￿xing cartels has been extensively studied in the literature. (See Selten (1973)
and d￿Aspremont et al. (1983) in the case of Cournot oligopolies and Deneckere
and Davidson (1985) for a Bertrand model with diﬀerentiated commodities and
Nocke (1999) for a recent contribution discussing the earlier literature.) In auc-
tions, the study of the stability of bidding rings is much more complex, as it
requires the analysis of auctions with asymmetric bidders. Mailath and Zem-
sky (1991) study stability of bidding rings in the simpler context of second-price
auctions, and Mac Afee and Mac Millan (1992) provide an example in the case
of ￿rst-price auctions.8 In spite of basic diﬀerences between our model and
traditional models of collusion in oligopolies and auctions, the stability of col-
lusive networks bears a close resemblance to the stability of bidding rings and
price-￿xing cartels. As ￿rms bene￿t from the formation of collusive agreements
by other ￿rms, free-riding incentives threaten in the same way the stability of
price-￿xing cartels, bidding rings and collusive networks. As in the case of car-
tels and bidding rings, our characterization of stable collusive networks results
from the balance between free-riding incentives and the bene￿ts of collusion.
In a series of papers closely related to our work, Goyal and Joshi (2000a) and
(2000b) and Goyal and Moraga (2000) apply the theory of economic networks
to models of oligopoly. Goyal and Joshi (2000a) and Goyal and Moraga (2000)
study the formation of cost-reducing alliances. By signing bilateral agreements,
￿rms can bene￿t from synergies in production and lower their production costs.
8In general ￿rst-price auctions, Pesendorfer (2000) presents partial characterization results
on the equilibrium of an auction with a bidding ring and independent bidders. However, the
issue of stability of the bidding ring is not addressed in the model.
7Goyal and Joshi (2000a) characterize stable networks when the cost reduction
is exogenous, and Goyal and Moraga (2000) study a model where ￿rms make
bilateral investments to reduce their costs. While the methodology they use is
similar to ours, the stable networks they characterize have no relation to stable
collusive networks. The main diﬀerence stems from a diﬀerence in the sign of
external eﬀects in the two models. In cost-reducing alliances, the formation of
al i n kh a snegative eﬀects on outsiders, whereas the formation of a link has a
positive eﬀect on outsiders in the case of market sharing agreements.9 Goyal
and Joshi (2000b) study the formation of bilateral trading agreements in an
international oligopolistic market. In spite of diﬀerences in the motivations, the
model they study is formally very similar to ours, as bilateral trading agreement
enabling ￿rms to enter each other￿s market can be interpreted as the converse
of market sharing agreements by which ￿rms commit to stay out of each other￿s
market. There are two important diﬀerences in the analyses. First, Goyal and
Joshi (2000b) only consider a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand, whereas we
study general pro￿t functions, encompassing diﬀerent models of oligopoly and
auctions. Second and more importantly, the objective functions of the actors
in the two models are diﬀerent. Goyal and Joshi (2000b) model countries￿
objective functions as the sum of the home ￿rm￿s pro￿t, consumer surplus
in the home country and import tariﬀs, whereas we suppose that ￿rms only
maximize pro￿ts. As a consequence, the stable networks in the two models are
very diﬀerent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we de-
scribe the general model of market sharing and characterize eﬃcient, stable and
strongly stable collusive networks. In Section 3, we discuss the application of
our model to oligopolistic markets and procurement auctions. In Section 4, we
extend our baseline model to take into account asymmetries among markets
and ￿rms. In Section 5, we conclude and discuss the limitations of our model.
9This diﬀerence between positive and negative external eﬀects also appears in the formation
of price-￿xing cartels and cost-reducing associations in oligopolies. (See Bloch (1997) and Yi
(1997).)
82 Networks of Market Sharing Agreements
2.1 The Model
We consider N ￿rms indexed by i =1 ,2,..N. We associate to each ￿rm a
market on which it is initially active. In the oligopolistic context, the market
of ￿rm i can be interpreted as its home market, and in the context of auctions,
we assume that each bidder has privileged access to one of the procurement
auctions. For any market i,w ed e n o t eb yni the number of active ￿rms on
the market. We consider a reduced form pro￿t function on each market, which
could arise either from oligopolistic interaction or from bidding competition,
and which only depends on the number of active ￿rms on the market. We let
π
j
i(ni) denote the pro￿to f￿rm j on market i. In the benchmark model, we




We suppose that the pro￿t function satis￿es the following axioms.
Axiom 2.1 Individual pro￿ts are decreasing in the number of ￿rms active on
the market, π(n) ≤ π(n − 1).
Axiom 2.2 Individual pro￿ts are log-convex in the number of ￿rms active on
the market, [π(n +1 )− π(n)]/π(n +1 )≥ [π(n) − π(n − 1)]/π(n).
Axiom 2.1 is a very intuitive condition, which guarantees that an increase
in the number of competitors reduces the pro￿t of each ￿rm. In the next
section, we show that this axiom is satis￿ed in all models of auctions and
oligopolies. Axiom 2.2 is more diﬃcult to satisfy, and embodies an important
structural property of pro￿ts. It indicates that the rate of decline of pro￿ts is
itself increasing in the number of ￿rms. Clearly, this axiom is stronger than
convexity of pro￿ts. In the next section, we provide suﬃcient conditions on
oligopoly models under which this axiom is satis￿ed, and show that pro￿ts are
always log-convex in private value auctions.
In addition to individual pro￿ts, we de￿ne total pro￿ts on the market as
T(n)=nπ(n). Depending on the context, we will de￿ne various measures of
welfare on each market, denoted W(n).
9Each pair of ￿rms (i,j) can sign a market sharing agreement whereby each
￿rm refrains from entering on the other ￿rm￿s market. This pairwise relation-
ship is captured by a binary variable, gij ∈ {0,1}. The set of market sharing
agreements gives rise to an undirected network g on the set of ￿rms. The total
pro￿ts of any ￿rm i can be expressed as a function of the network g of market
sharing agreements. We denote by ni(g) the number of ￿rms on market i,g i v e n
the network g. Total pro￿ts are given by the sum of the pro￿ts ￿rm i collects






2.2 Eﬃcient and Stable Networks
Our analysis of the formation of market sharing agreements is based on notions
of eﬃciency and stability. We distinguish between two types of eﬃciency. A
network is eﬃcient if it maximizes total industry pro￿ts and socially eﬃcient
if it maximizes social welfare. Formally,






De￿nition 2.2 An e t w o r kg is socially eﬃcient if and only if there is no net-





We borrow our concept of stability from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)￿s
general study of strategic networks. A network is pairwise stable if no pair of
￿rms wants to establish a new link and no individual ￿rm wants to sever a link.
Formally, using the notations g+gij and g−gij to denote the network obtained
from network g after adding (respectively subtracting) the link (i,j),
De￿nition 2.3 (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) An e t w o r kg is (pairwise) stable
if and only if (i) ∀i,j ∈ N s.t. gij =1 , Πi(g) ≥ Πi(g−gij) and Πj(g) ≥ Πj(g−
gij); and (ii) ∀i,j ∈ N s.t. gij =0 , if Πi(g + gij) > Πi(g) then Πj(g + gij) <
Πj(g).
10The stability notion of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is a relatively weak
criterion, as ￿rms can only create or sever links one by one. As ￿rms are not al-
lowed to sever more than one link at once, stable networks cannot emerge as the
outcome of a noncooperative linking game, where ￿rms choose independently
the links they want to form. In order to deal with this problem, we consider an
alternative notion of stability, directly related to linking games.
We consider the simultaneous linking game introduced by Myerson (1991).10
For each ￿rm i, the strategy space Si is the set of all subsets of N\{i}, i.e., the
set of all players with whom i can form links. (We also allow for si = ∅,t h e
￿rm forms no link). A link gij is formed if and only if i ∈ sj and j ∈ si.W el e t
g(s1,...,sn) denote the graph formed when every ￿rm i chooses si.
De￿nition 2.4 As t r a t e g yp r o ￿le {s∗
1,...,s∗
n} is a (pure strategy) Nash equi-




−i)) ∀si ∈ Si.
The linking game typically admits a large number of Nash equilibria, re-
￿ecting coordination failures between two agents who would both bene￿t from
forming a link but do not form it. In order to eliminate this coordination fail-
ure, we adopt a re￿nement which is closely related to Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996)￿s notion of pairwise stability. We say that an equilibrium is pairwise
strong if it is immune to deviations by coalitions of two ￿rms.
De￿nition 2.5 As t r a t e g yp r o ￿le {s∗
1,...,s∗
n} is a pairwise strong Nash equi-
librium of the linking game if and only if there does not exist a pair (i,j) of

























De￿nition 2.6 An e t w o r kg is strongly (pairwise) stable if and only if there
exists a pairwise strong Nash equilibrium of the linking game, {s∗
1,...,s∗
n},s u c h
that g = g(s∗
1,...,s ∗
n).
10See Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) for recent studies of linking games.
11Lemma 2.1 Any strongly pairwise stable network is pairwise stable.
Proof. The proof is almost immediate. Suppose that network g is not
stable. If gij =1and Πi(g) < Πi(g − gij) for some i,j, ￿rm i would bene￿t
from a unilateral deviation, choosing si = s∗
i\{j}. If gij =0, Πi(g+gij) > Πi(g)
and Πj(g + gij) ≥ Πj(g),t h e ng is not immune to a joint deviation by the two
￿rms, si = s∗
i ∪ {j},s j = s∗
j ∪ {i}.
2.2.1 Networks and Graphs
Before we can characterize eﬃcient and stable collusive networks, we need to
introduce some notations and terminology from graph theory. A network is
complete if all ￿rms are linked (gij =1∀ i,j, i 6= j) and empty if no ￿rms
are linked (gij =0∀ i,j). A ￿rm i is isolated if gij =0∀ j 6= i. An e t w o r k
g is connected if there exists a path linking any two ￿rms in g.A component
g0 of g is a maximally connected subset of g.W e l e t m(g0) denote the size
of a component g0, i.e., the number of ￿rms belonging to g0. A component is
complete if all ￿rms inside the component are linked.
We will consider speci￿c networks, called regular networks. An e t w o r kg is
regular of degree k,o rk-regular,i fa l l￿rms have the same number of links k.
One of the best known results in graph theory (see, e.g., Lovasz, 1979, p. 249)
states:
Lemma 2.2 Consider k ≤ N − 1.I f kN is even, there exists a k-regular
network. Otherwise (i.e., if both k and N are odd), it is possible to form one
or two ￿almost-regular networks of degree k￿, in which all but one ￿rm have
degree k, and the remaining ￿rm either has degree (k − 1) or (k +1 ) .
Figure 1 illustrates these de￿nitions, by presenting some networks for the
case N =6 .
2.2.2 Eﬃcient Collusive Networks
The characterization of eﬃcient networks in our model is very simple. As
markets are independent, the maximization of total pro￿ts or social welfare on
all markets amounts to choosing optimal number of ￿r m so ne a c hm a r k e t .L e t
nP and nO denote the maximizers of T(n) and W(n), respectively. We obtain:
12A. Complete network B. Complete component 
of size 5and an isolated 
firm
C. Two complete
components of sizes 3, 2
and an isolated firm.
D. 1-regular network E. 2-regular network (1) F. 2-regular network (2)
G. Incomplete network. 
4 firms have 3 links, 
2 have 2.
H. Incomplete network.
4 firms have 2 links,
2 have 1 (1)
I. Incomplete network.
4 firms have 2 links,
2 have 1. (2)
Figure 1:
13Proposition 2.1 If N(N −nP) is even, a network is eﬃcient if and only if it
is a regular network of degree N −nP. If N(N −nP) is odd and total pro￿ts are
single-peaked in n,an e t w o r ki se ﬃcient if and only if it is an almost regular
network of degree N−nP. Similarly, if N(N−nO) is even, a network is socially
eﬃcient if and only if it is a regular network of degree N − nO. If N(N − nO)
is odd and social welfare is single-peaked in n,an e t w o r ki se ﬃcient if and only
if it is an almost regular network of degree N − n0
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
Eﬃcient networks are thus characterized by a strong symmetry property.
In eﬃcient or socially eﬃcient networks, all (or almost all) ￿rms have the same
number of market sharing agreements, and all (or almost) all markets have the
same number of active ￿rms. As Figure 1 shows, there may exist more than one
k−regular network for ￿xed values of N and k.11 Some k−regular networks are
connected, others are not ; and the global architecture of k-regular networks
m a yv a r yal o t .W h e n￿rms and markets are symmetric, in many applications
we consider, total pro￿ts are decreasing in the number of active ￿rms, and
social welfare is increasing. Hence nP =1and nO = N, and there is a unique
eﬃcient network (the complete network) and a unique socially eﬃcient network
(the empty network).
2.2.3 Stable Collusive Networks
We now turn to the analysis of stable collusive networks. Applying Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996)￿s de￿nition to our model, we obtain the following conditions
for pairwise stability:




π(ni(g)) ≥ π(ni(g)+1 )+π(nj(g)+1 ) ,
π(nj(g)) ≥ π(nj(g) + 1) + π(ni(g)+1 ) .
(2)




if π(ni(g) − 1) > π(ni(g)) + π(nj(g)),
then π(nj(g) − 1) < π(nj(g)) + π(ni(g)).
(3)
11In fact, as N becomes large, the number of k−regular networks increases dramatically.
(See the discussion in Bollobas (1979, p. 158).)
14We establish three lemmata that will allow us to characterize the set of
stable networks in the benchmark model.
Lemma 2.3 Under Axiom 2.1,i fn e t w o r kg is stable, then ∀i,j ∈ N s.t. gij =
1,n i(g)=nj(g).
Proof. Since g is stable, Condition (2) is met. Hence, we must simultane-
ously have π(ni(g)) > π(nj(g)+1)and π(nj(g)) > π(ni(g)+1). By Axiom 2.1,
this implies that nj(g) − 1 <n i(g) <n j(g)+1⇔ ni(g)=nj(g).
Lemma 2.3 shows that when two ￿rms are connected by a market sharing
agreement, they must have the same number of active ￿rms on their home
market. The intuition underlying this result is easily grasped. By forming a
market sharing agreement, a ￿rm bene￿ts from a decrease in the number of
competitors on its home market, but loses access to a foreign market. If home
markets were asymmetric, the ￿rm with the larger number of competitors on
its own market would have no incentive to sign a market sharing agreement, as
the pro￿t it makes on the other ￿rm￿s market is higher than the pro￿ti tm a k e s
on its home market. While Lemma 2.3 implies that, inside a component of a
collusive network, all ￿rms have the same number of links, it does not guarantee
that components are complete. Our second lemma establishes this result.
Lemma 2.4 Under Axioms 2.1 and 2.2, if network g is stable, then any com-
ponent g0 of g is complete.
Proof. Suppose g0 is not complete. Then, there exist three ￿rms i,j,k in
the component for which gij = gjk =1and gik =0 .B e c a u s e g is pairwise
stable, we know from Lemma 2.3 that ni(g)=nj(g)=nk(g) ≡ n. Stability
of g also implies that condition (2) holds for i and j, while condition (3) holds
for i and k.T h a ti s ,π(n) ≥ 2π(n +1 )and π(n − 1) < 2π(n). But this implies
π(n)/π(n +1 )> π(n − 1)/π(n), in contradiction to Axiom 2.2.
Lemma 2.4 shows that whenever two ￿rms are linked to a third by a market
sharing agreement, they are also linked among themselves. We interpret this
result by stating that ￿rms form complete market sharing alliances, where all
members of the alliance agree to stay out of the markets of other alliance mem-
bers. Notice that the proof of this lemma requires log-convexity of pro￿ts. As
15pro￿ts are log-convex in the number of active ￿rms, the incentive to enter into
a market sharing agreement is higher, the more market sharing agreements the
￿rm has already signed. Hence, in an alliance where, by lemma 2.3, all ￿rms
have formed the same number of market sharing agreements, the total number
of collusive links must be maximal. The next lemma deals with the existence
of distinct components in a stable collusive network.
Lemma 2.5 Under Axioms 2.1 and 2.2, if network g is stable and contains
two distinct components g0 and g00,t h e nm(g0) 6= m(g00).
Proof. Take two ￿rms i,j in component g0 and a ￿rm k in g00.S u p p o s e ,b y
contradiction, that m(g0)=m(g00). Therefore, we have ni(g)=nj(g)=nk(g) ≡
n. Stability of g implies that condition (2) holds for i and j, while condition
(3) holds for i and k.T h a ti s ,π(n) ≥ 2π(n+1)and π(n−1) < 2π(n). But this
implies π(n)/π(n +1 )> π(n − 1)/π(n), in contradiction to Axiom 2.2.
Lemma 2.5 establishes that, in a stable collusive network, distinct alliances
of ￿rms can form, but they must be of diﬀerent sizes. The asymmetry between
alliances is a necessary condition for stability, since ￿rms in two symmetric
alliances always have an incentive to form a market sharing agreement by log-
convexity of pro￿ts. In a stable collusive network with multiple alliances, ￿rms
in smaller alliances (with a larger number of competitors on their home market)
are reluctant to sign market sharing agreements with ￿rms in larger alliances
( w i t has m a l l e rn u m b e ro fc o m p e t i t o r so nt h e i rh o m em a r k e t ) .
We are now in a position to complete the characterization of pairwise stable
collusive networks. De￿ne m∗ as the minimal integer such that π(N − m∗ +
1)/π(N −m∗+2)≥ 2. (The existence of a minimal integer m∗is guaranteed by
log-convexity of pro￿ts.) We interpret m∗ as the minimal size that an alliance
must reach so that ￿rms have an incentive to sign market sharing agreements.
Proposition 2.2 Let m∗ be the minimal integer such that π(N−m∗+1)/π(N−
m∗ +2 )≥ 2.U n d e rA x i o m s2 . 1 and 2.2, a network g is stable if and only if it
can be decomposed into a set of isolated ￿rms and distinct complete components
g1,g 2,...,gL such that m(gl) 6= m(gl0) ∀l 6= l0,m (gl) ≥ m∗ ∀l.F u r t h e r m o r e ,i f
m∗ =2 , there is at most one isolated ￿rm.
16Proof. Lemmata 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 show that if a network is stable, ￿rms
which are not isolated form complete components of diﬀerent sizes. Further-
more, in a stable network, all ￿rms inside a component must have an in-
centive to sign a market sharing agreement, and Condition (2) implies that
π(N − m(gl)+1 )≥ 2π(N − m(gl)+2 )∀l. Finally, note that if m∗ =2 , there
cannot be more than one isolated ￿rm.
Conversely, suppose that the graph g can be decomposed into isolated ￿rms
and complete components of diﬀerent sizes, with m(gl) ≥ m∗ ∀l.W ew i l ls h o w
that the network is stable. Clearly, as long as m∗ > 2, by Condition (3), isolated
players have no incentive to create new links. We now consider a link between
two players i and j belonging to two components gl and gl0 with m(gl) <m (gl0).
By Condition (3) again, player i, belonging to the smallest component, refuses
to form a new link. Finally, as m(gl) ≥ m∗ ∀l, no player inside a component has
an incentive to cut a link, and the network is thus stable. Finally, if m∗ =2 ,
any two isolated ￿rms have an incentive to form a link. Hence, there can be at
most one isolated ￿rm in a stable network.
Proposition 2.2 provides a full characterization of the pairwise stable net-
works when ￿rms and markets are symmetric. In a collusive network, all al-
liances must reach a minimal size (re￿ecting the fact that the incentives to form
market sharing agreements increase with the size of the alliance), alliances must
be complete and of diﬀerent sizes. Typically, stable collusive networks are not
unique. There might exist diﬀerent con￿gurations of alliances which can be
sustained in a stable network. In particular, our characterization shows that
t h en u m b e ro fi s o l a t e d￿rms, free-riding on the formation of alliances by other
￿rms, may vary from one con￿guration to another.
Using Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, we can compare eﬃcient and pairwise stable
networks when total pro￿ts are single-peaked in the number of active ￿rms.
Two cases may arise. If T(1) ≥ T(2), then the eﬃcient network is the complete
network, and pairwise stable networks necessarily have at least as many links
as the eﬃcient network. If, on the other hand, T(1) <T(2),t h e nπ(1) < 2π(2),
and the only pairwise stable is the empty network. Again, eﬃcient networks
have at least as many links as the pairwise stable network. Hence, we ￿nd that
pairwise stable networks are always under-connected with respect to eﬃcient
17networks. This result clearly stems from the fact that individual ￿rms have
an incentive to free-ride on the formation of market sharing alliances by other
￿rms.12 Notice however that we are unable to compare pairwise stable and
socially eﬃcient networks, because the social welfare function W(n) typically
includes information which is not contained in individual pro￿t functions, π(n).
2.2.4 Strongly Stable Collusive Networks
Finally, in order to re￿ne the set of pairwise stable collusive networks, we turn
to the analysis of strongly pairwise stable networks.
Proposition 2.3 Under Axioms 2.1 and 2.2, a network g is strongly stable
if and only if it can be decomposed into a set of isolated ￿rms and distinct
complete components g1,g 2,...,gL such that (i) π(N − m(gl)+1 )≥ π(N)+
(m(gl) − 1)π(N − m(gl)+2 )for all l, and (ii) m(gl) 6= m(gl0) for all l 6= l0.
Furthermore, if m∗ =2 , the graph contains at most one isolated ￿rm.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
According to Proposition 2.3, strongly stable networks diﬀer from stable
networks in the restriction placed on the size of alliances. In a strongly stable
network, component sizes must satisfy the very demanding condition: π(N −
m(gl)+1)≥ π(N)+(m(gl)−1)π(N −m(gl)+2).13 To interpret this condition,
note that strongly stable collusive networks must be immune to the severance
of any number of links by a given ￿rm. If a ￿rm bene￿ts from reneging on a
market sharing agreement, it must be willing to renege on all its market sharing
agreements, as the pro￿t it makes on a foreign market is always superior to the
pro￿t it makes on its home market after severing a link. Hence, the most
pro￿table deviation for a ￿rm is to renege on all its market sharing agreements
12This result stands in sharp contrast to the two examples discussed in Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996). Both in the connections and the co-author models, they show that pairwise stable
networks are overconnected with respect to the eﬃcient network. The diﬀerences between
our results and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)￿s examples are due to diﬀerences in the value
function of the network in the models.
13Because π(N − m(gl)+1 )− π(N)+( m(gl) − 1)π(N − m(gl)+2 )is not monotonic in
m(gl), this condition does not de￿ne a lower bound on the sizes of components. In diﬀerent
applications, we will see that this condition often de￿nes an interval of integers.
18at once, and in every component, ￿rms must prefer to be linked than to destroy
all their links.
Proposition 2.3 also sheds light on the role of bilateralism in the formation
of market sharing agreements. If ￿rms were to enter multilateral agreements,
by which they agree to share markets with all other members of the alliance,
the incentive to defect would be much stronger. In a sense, collusion is easier
t os u s t a i nw i t hb i l a t e r a la g r e e m e n t st h a nw i t hm u l t i l a t e r a la g r e e m e n t s .
3 Applications
3.1 Cournot Oligopoly with Homogeneous Products
In our ￿rst application, we consider a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with ho-
mogeneous products. Letting qi denote the quantity produced by ￿rm i (i =
1,2,...,n)a n dQ =
P
qi market demand, the Cournot oligopoly is de￿ned by
an inverse market demand P(Q) and individual cost functions c(qi). Each ￿rm￿s
pro￿t on the market is given by
πi = qiP(Q) − c(qi).










I nt h en e x tp r o p o s i t i o n ,w ep r o v i d es u ﬃcient conditions for Axioms 2.1 and
2.2 in the symmetric Cournot model, and derive comparative statics on total
industry pro￿ts and social welfare.
Proposition 3.1 (i) If costs are increasing and convex and E(Q) > −1,i n -
dividual pro￿ts are decreasing in the number of active ￿rms on the market.
(ii) If costs are linear, E(Q) > −1 and E0(Q) ≥ 0, individual pro￿ts are log-
convex in the number of active ￿rms on the market. (iii) If costs are linear and
E(Q) > −1, total pro￿ts are decreasing in the number of active ￿rms on the
market. (iv) If costs are linear and E(Q) > −1, total surplus is increasing in
the number of active ￿rms on the market.
19Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
The ￿rst statement of the proposition is a classical comparative statics result
on Cournot oligopolies (termed ￿quasi-competitiveness￿ in Amir and Lambson,
2000). Vives (1999, pp. 105-107) gives early references to this result. State-
ments (iii) and (iv) are also well-known results, discussed for instance in Vives
(1999, pp. 107-109). Statement (ii), providing suﬃcient conditions for the log-
convexity of individual pro￿ts, is a new result. While the conditions are clearly
very restrictive, we show below that they are satis￿ed by speci￿c families of
inverse demand functions.
3.1.1 Examples
Example 3.1 Iso-elastic inverse demand function
Suppose ￿rst that demand is given by P(Q)=1− Qα for α > 0. (If α =1 ,
demand is linear; if 0 < α < 1, demand is convex, and if α > 1,d e m a n d
is concave.) Observe that E(Q)=α − 1. As α > 0,E (Q)+1 > 0 and
furthermore, E0(Q) ≥ 0.T h es u ﬃcient conditions of Proposition 3.1 are thus
satis￿ed. In particular, we know that total pro￿ts are decreasing in n,s othe
eﬃcient network is the complete network, and total surplus is increasing in n,




α (n + α)−1+α
α .
In Appendix 6.4, we show that t h eo n l yp a i r w i s es t a b l en e t w o r k sa r et h ee m p t y
and complete networks for a Cournot oligopoly with isoelastic demand.
Turning now to pairwise strongly stable networks, the complete network is
pairwise strongly stable if and only if π(1) ≥ π(N)+(N−1)π(2). We show again
in Appendix 6.4 that the latter inequality cannot be satis￿ed for any value of
α. We conclude that the complete network is never pairwise strongly stable,
and hence the only pairwise strongly stable network is the empty network.
Example 3.2 Exponential inverse demand function
Suppose now that the inverse demand is given by P(Q)=e−Q. Notice that
in that case, E(Q)=−Q,a n dt h es u ﬃcient conditions of Proposition 3.1 are
20not satis￿ed. We can still show directly that the equilibrium pro￿t functions
are decreasing and log-convex in n.E a c h ￿rm￿s pro￿t function is given by
π(q)=qe−Q. This pro￿t function is strictly quasi-concave in q,a n da t t a i n s
a maximum at q∗ =1 . We compute the equilibrium pro￿ta sπ(n)=e−n.
Clearly, π(n) is a decreasing function of n and logπ(n)=−n is a convex
function. Furthermore, T(n)=ne−n is a decreasing function of n (so the
eﬃcient network is the complete network)a n dW(n)=1−e−n is an increasing
function of n (so the socially eﬃcient network is the empty network).
Now note that π(n)/π(n +1 )=e>2,∀n. Hence, any two ￿rms have an
incentive to form a link, and the set of pairwise stable networks is very large: any
network with complete components of diﬀerent sizes and at most one isolated
￿rm is pairwise stable.
To re￿ne the set of pairwise stable networks, consider now the condition
characterizing pairwise strongly stable networks: π(N −m+1)−π(N)−(m−
1)π(N − m +2 )≥ 0. De￿ne
f(N,m)=e−N+m−1 − e−N − (m − 1)e−N+m−2
= e−N(em−1 − 1 − (m − 1)em−2).
It is easy to check that f(N,m) ≥ 0 if and only if m =2or m =3 .W ec o n c l u d e
that in pairwise strongly stable networks, the sizes of components is either equal
to 2 or to 3. The following table characterizes pairwise strongly stable networks
for N =2 ,3,4,5 and 6. For N ≥ 7; no network is pairwise strongly stable.






213.2 Oligopoly with Heterogeneous Products
We consider an oligopoly model with diﬀerentiated products, where on each
market, a representative consumer has a quadratic surplus function given by




















with d ∈ [0,1[. Parameter d is an inverse measure of the degree of diﬀerentiation
between varieties produced by diﬀerent ￿rms: they are independent when d =0
and perfect substitutes when d → 1. Maximizing (4) subject to the consumer￿s
budget constraint, yields the linear inverse demand schedule pi =1− qi −
d
P









(1 − d)(1+d(n − 1))
, δ =
d
(1 − d)(1+d(n − 1))
.
Assuming that production is costless, Cournot and Bertrand equilibria yield
the following results:
qc = 1




(1+d(n−1))(2+d(n−3)) pb = 1−d
2+d(n−3) (Bertrand).
It is readily checked that Axioms 2.1 and 2.2 both hold for πc(n)=pc(n)qc(n)
and πb(n)=pb(n)qb(n). Total surplus is given by
Wc(n)=





n(3 + d(n − 4))(1 + d(n − 2))
2(2+d(n − 3))
2 (1 + d(n − 1))
.
Simple computations establish that Wc(n) and Wb(n) are both increasing in
the number of ￿rms, meaning that the socially eﬃcient network is the empty
network in both cases.
The following table lists, for N =6and selected values of d, the pairwise
stable networks and the optimal number of ￿rms under Cournot and Bertrand
competition. (The strongly pairwise stable networks are underlined).
22Cournot Bertrand
d Pairwise stable networks nP Pairwise stable networks nP
0.9 {6} ,{1,1,1,1,1,1} 1 {6},{1,1,1,1,1,1},{5,1} 1
0.8 {1,1,1,1,1,1} 2 {6},{1,1,1,1,1,1},{5,1} 1
0.7 {1,1,1,1,1,1} 2 {6},{1,1,1,1,1,1} 2
0.5 {1,1,1,1,1,1} 3 {1,1,1,1,1,1} 2
0.1 {1,1,1,1,1,1} 6 {1,1,1,1,1,1} 5
As products become more diﬀerentiated, collusive networks are harder to
sustain. This result is easily interpreted. As products become more diﬀeren-
tiated, competition on every market becomes less ￿erce. Hence, the bene￿to f
a market sharing agreement, resulting in a reduction in the number of com-
petitors on the home market, is reduced, and the cost, measured by the pro￿t
forlorn on foreign markets is increased. Furthermore, as products become more
diﬀerentiated, the eﬃcient number of ￿rms on each market, nP increases, so
that the eﬃcient networks (the N −nP regular networks) become more sparse.
This result is also very intuitive. In a model with diﬀerentiated products, an
increase in the number of ￿rms leads to an expansion of demand. When prod-
ucts become more diﬀerentiated, this expansion of demand is more pronounced
and overcomes the eﬀect of a reduction in competition on total industry prof-
its. Finally, not surprisingly, for any ￿xed value of product diﬀerentiation d,
collusion is easier to sustain under price competition than under quantity com-
petition. This result is reminiscent of the literature on cartels where Deneckere
and Davidson (1985) show that full collusion is a stable outcome under price
competition, while it cannot be sustained under quantity competition.
3.3 Auctions
In this application, we consider a set of ￿rms, i =1 ,2,...,N, participating in
procurement auctions. For each auction, ￿rm i draws a cost parameter ci dis-
tributed according to the common distribution function F(ci) with continuous
density f(ci) over the support [0,C]. Furthermore, suppose that the function
J(c)=c +
F(c)
f(c) is increasing in c for any c ∈ [0,C]. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we assume that the buyer sets a reservation price at C, and we consider
any auction setting which allocates the contract to the lowest bidder. By the
23revenue-equivalence theorem (see, e.g. Riley and Samuelson, 1981, Proposition
1, p. 383), the ex ante expected payoﬀ of every ￿rm is independent of the








n denotes the i-th order statistic among n draws from the common
distribution F. By a simple application of the theory of order statistics (see

















Concerning social welfare, we distinguish between two measures of welfare:
the expected gain of the buyer and the total surplus generated in the auction.
The following proposition shows that Axioms 2.1 and 2.2 are always satis￿ed
in private value auctions, and provides comparative statics on total pro￿ts and
social welfare.
Proposition 3.2 In a private value procurement auction,ex ante individual
pro￿ts are strictly decreasing and strictly log-convex in the number of active
￿rms on the market. Furthermore, total pro￿ts are strictly decreasing in the
number of active ￿rms on the market. The expected gain of the buyer and the
expected total surplus are increasing in the number of active ￿rms on the market.
Proof. See Appendix 6.5.
The comparative statics eﬀects of an increase in the number of bidders
on individual pro￿ts, total pro￿ts and social surplus are well-known in auction
theory (see Mac Afee and Mac Millan (1987, p. 711) and the references therein).
The log-convexity of individual pro￿ts in the number of bidders is an original
result, providing a strong structural condition on the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei n
the number of bidders on individual pro￿ts. Proposition 3.2 shows that, in a
procurement auction, the eﬃcient network is the complete network, and the
socially eﬃcient network is empty. We now illustrate our results with two
examples.
243.4 Examples
Example 3.3 Uniform distribution




It is easy to see that π(2)/π(3) = 2. Hence, there are three pairwise stable
network architectures: the complete network, the empty network and a network
with one component of size N − 1 and an isolated bidder. Straightforward
computations show that the complete network is pairwise strongly stable if and
only if N ≤ 3 and that the network with one component of size N − 1 is never
pairwise strongly stable.
Example 3.4 Exponential distribution




for n>1 and π(1) = +∞.
By analogy with the previous example, we see that π(3)/π(4) = 2. Hence,
there are four pairwise stable network architectures: the complete network,
the empty network and networks with components of sizes N − 1 or N − 2.
Notice that the complete network is strongly pairwise stable, the network with
ac o m p o n e n to fs i z eN − 1 is pairwise strongly stable if and only if N ≤ 4 and
the network with a component of size N − 2 is never pairwise strongly stable.
4E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we extend our baseline model by allowing for asymmetries be-
tween ￿rms and markets. We ￿rst consider the case where markets are symmet-
ric, but each ￿rm bene￿ts from an incumbency advantage on its own market.
We then study a situation where all ￿rms are symmetric, but markets are dif-
ferent.
254.1 Incumbency Advantage
Firms involved in market sharing agreements generally justify market sharing
by the presence of large entry costs into foreign markets. In order to analyze
the validity of this argument, we consider two models where incumbents bene￿t
from an advantage in their home market. In the ￿rst model, ￿rms face a ￿xed
entry cost to enter foreign markets. In the second model, ￿rms incur a unit
transportation cost when selling in a market diﬀerent from their home market.
4.1.1 Fixed Entry Costs
We denote by K the ￿xed entry cost into foreign markets. As we want to ab-
stract from situations where ￿rms face exogenous barriers to entry, we suppose
that the ￿xed cost is lower than the lowest possible pro￿t on each market, i.e.,
K<π(N). Under this condition, we can easily generalize Lemma 2.3 to show
that any two ￿rms linked by a market sharing agreement have the same number
of active ￿rms on their home markets.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that K<π(N).U n d e rA x i o m2 . 1,i fn e t w o r kg is stable,
then ∀i,j ∈ N s.t. gij =1 ,n i(g)=nj(g).
Proof. With ￿xed costs, a network is pairwise stable if and only if the
following conditions hold:




π(ni(g)) ≥ π(ni(g)+1 )+π(nj(g)+1 )− K
π(nj(g)) ≥ π(nj(g) + 1) + π(ni(g)+1 )− K
(5)




if π(ni(g) − 1) > π(ni(g)) + π(nj(g)) − K,
then π(nj(g) − 1) < π(nj(g)) + π(ni(g)) − K.
(6)
Suppose by contradiction that gij =1 , and ni(g)+1≤ nj(g). Then by Axiom
2.1, π(nj(g)) ≤ π(ni(g)+1). Furthermore, as K<π(N),π(nj(g)+1)−K>0
and the second inequality of Condition (6) is violated.
However, the characterization result of Proposition 2.2 cannot be generalized
t ot h ec a s eo f￿xed entry costs. Formally, a characterization of stable networks
26under entry costs requires a condition on individual pro￿ts which is stronger
than log-convexity, namely 2π(n +1 )− π(n) > 2π(n) − π(n − 1) ∀n. 14 This
condition is violated in most applications we have considered.
While we are unable to obtain a full characterization of stable collusive
networks, we remark that the presence of ￿xed costs makes market sharing
agreements more attractive to ￿rms, as the bene￿t of the agreement on the
home market remains the same, but the loss on foreign markets is reduced.
Hence, we expect that market sharing agreements are easier to sustain when
￿rms bene￿t from an incumbency advantage on their home market. In par-
ticular, whenever the complete network is stable without entry costs, it is also
stable once entry costs are introduced.15 In general, as the following exam-
ple illustrates, the presence of ￿xed entry costs generates pairwise stable and
strongly stable networks with a denser set of market sharing agreements.
Example 4.1 Linear Cournot model with ￿xed entry costs
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with N =6, zero marginal cost and a linear
inverse demand P =1 0− Q.W ec o m p u t e
πi(ni)=
100
(ni +1 ) 2, πj(ni)=
100
(ni +1 ) 2 − K,
T(ni)=ni
100
(ni +1 ) 2 − (ni − 1)K, W(ni)=
50ni(ni +2 )
(ni +1 ) 2 − (ni − 1)K.
It is easily seen, in this example, that 2π(n) − π(n − 1) is not monotonic in n,
so we cannot apply a general method to characterize pairwise stable networks.
Instead, we compute directly the set of stable networks by following two steps.
We ￿rst characterize the set I of integers for which π(n) − 2π(n +1 )≥ K.I n
any stable collusive network, the sizes of home markets must belong to that set,
so we can, in this ￿rst step, eliminate a number of possible networks. In the
second step, we continue to eliminate candidate stable networks by checking
14To see that this condition is stronger than log-convexity, note that if 2π(n +1 )− π(n) >
















Assuming that the pro￿t function is decreasing in n,t h i si m p l i e st h a ti ti sl o g - c o n v e xi nn.
15The complete network is stable if and only if π(1) ≥ 2π(2).B u tt h e n ,π(1) ≥ 2π(2) − K
for any K, and the complete network is also stable with entry costs.
27the conditions for stability (Conditions (5) and (6)). It turns out that all stable
networks are formed of complete components, so we can characterize a stable
n e t w o r kb yc o m p o n e n ts i z e s .
It is easily checked that T(n) is a decreasing function, so the eﬃcient network
is the complete network. Total surplus W(n) is a concave function, attaining its
maximum at nO =
3 p
100/K − 1. The following table lists, for selected values
of K, the set of integers I,the pairwise stable and strongly stable networks
(pairwise strongly stable networks are underlined), and the optimal number of
￿r m so ne a c hm a r k e t .
Fixed cost I Pairwise stable networks nO
K =0 1 {6},{1,1,1,1,1,1} 6
K =0 .5 1 {6},{1,1,1,1,1,1} 5
K =1 1 {6},{1,1,1,1,1,1} 5
K =1 .5 1,2,5 {6},{5,1},{2,2,2} 4
K =2 1,2,3,4,5 {6},{5,1},{4,2},{3,2,1} 4
For small values of the ￿xed cost (K =0 .5 and 1), the situation is similar to
the baseline model with K =0 . Stable networks are either complete or empty,
and the only strongly stable network is empty. By contrast, when K =2 ,
any market sharing agreement is pro￿table, and stable networks can be formed
with any combination of components of diﬀerent sizes. In that case, the strong
s t a b i l i t yc r i t e r i o ni m p o s e sa nu p p e rb o u n do nt h es i z e so fc o m p o n e n t s ,a n do n l y
one network survives this criterion. Interestingly, there exists an intermediate
case, K =1 .5, where, in a stable collusive network, ￿rms either form large or
small components. The strongly stable network is then obtained with ￿rms
entering exactly one market sharing agreement.
Socially eﬃcient networks are 1-regular networks for K =0 .5,1 and 2-
regular networks for K =1 .5,2. Hence, in the presence of ￿xed costs, pairwise
stable networks are not necessarily more connected than socially eﬃcient net-
works. In fact, all pairwise strongly stable networks are under-connected with
respect to the socially eﬃcient network. Our example thus suggests that the
line of defense adopted by ￿rms involved in market sharing agreements may
rest on solid ground.
284.1.2 Transportation costs
We assume now that ￿rms incur a unit transportation cost, denoted t>0,w h e n
selling on a foreign market. Consider a homogeneous Cournot market with
inverse demand given by P(Q)=1− Q. Again, to abstract from situations
where ￿rms face exogenous barriers to entry, we assume that t<1/N. The
pro￿t levels for domestic and foreign ￿rms are respectively
πd(n)=
￿









There exists no general method to compute pairwise stable collusive net-
works in this example. (In particular, two ￿rms may be linked but have diﬀerent
numbers of competitors on their home markets.) We note that, as in the case
of ￿xed entry costs, collusion is easier to sustain when ￿rms face transportation
costs in foreign markets. In our example, this is re￿ected by the following two
facts.
￿ The complete network is always pairwise stable. Stability of the complete
network requires πd(1) ≥ πd(2) + πf(2) ⇐⇒ (1/36)(10t +1 )( 1− 2t) ≥
0,w h i c hi ss a t i s ￿ed since, by assumption, t<1/N < 1/2.
￿ T h ee m p t yn e t w o r ki sp a i r w i s es t a b l ei fa n do n l yi f t is low enough.S t a -
bility of the empty network requires πd(N − 1) < πd(N)+πf(N) ⇐⇒
t<ﬂ t(N),w h e r eﬂ t(N) reaches a maximum for N =5(ﬂ t(5) = 0.063)a n d
then decreases with N.
Other stable networks may emerge for diﬀerent values of t.S u p p o s e t h a t
N =6 . It is easily checked that the 1− regular network is stable for 0.0608 ≤
t<0.0631. Incomplete networks may also be pairwise stable. For 0.0631 ≤ t<
0.107, incomplete networks with 4 ￿rms having 2 links and 2 ￿rms 1 (networks
H and I in Figure 1) are pairwise stable. For 0.107 ≤ t<1/6, the incomplete
network with 4 ￿rms having 3 links and 2 ￿rms 2 (network G in Figure 1) is
pairwise stable.
4.2 Asymmetric markets
We now consider a model where ￿rms are symmetric, but markets are diﬀerent.
Furthermore, we suppose that markets can be ranked according to pro￿tability.
29Either πi(n) ≤ πj(n) for all n or πi(n) ≥ πj(n) for all n. We show that, in
ap a i r w i s es t a b l en e t w o r k ,￿r m sw i t hl e s sp r o ￿table home markets always sign
more market sharing agreements.
Lemma 4.2 Suppose that πi(n) ≥ πj(n) for all n and that gij =1 .T h e n ,
under Axiom 2.1,i fn e t w o r kg is pairwise stable, then ni(g) ≥ nj(g).
Proof. The pairwise stability conditions are given by




πi(ni(g)) ≥ πi(ni(g)+1 )+πj(nj(g)+1 ) ,
πj(nj(g)) ≥ πj(nj(g)+1 )+πi(ni(g)+1 ) .
(7)




if πi(ni(g) − 1) > πi(ni(g)) + πj(nj(g)),
then πj(nj(g) − 1) < πj(nj(g)) + πi(ni(g)).
(8)
Since πi(n) ≥ πj(n) ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N, the most stringent of the two conditions
(7) is πj(nj(g)) ≥ πj(nj(g)+1 )+πi(ni(g)+1 ) . For this condition to hold, we
must have πj(nj(g)) > πi(ni(g)+1 )which, from Axiom 2.1, is equivalent to
nj(g) <n i(g)+1 .
Lemma 4.2 is easily interpreted. A ￿rm with a less pro￿table market only
has an incentive to sign a market sharing agreement with a ￿rm on a more
pro￿table market if the pro￿ts it makes on the foreign market is smaller than
the pro￿t it makes on the home market. Hence, for a link to be stable, it must be
that the number of competitors is larger on the more pro￿table market. Notice
in particular that Lemma 4.2 allows for the formation of incomplete collusive
networks, where diﬀerent ￿rms form diﬀerent numbers of agreements. This is
illustrated in Example 4.2, where an incomplete alliance is formed in a pairwise
stable collusive network.
Example 4.2 Asymmetric markets and Bertrand competition.
Suppose that there are three markets: two identical ￿large￿ markets and
one ￿small￿ market. Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated products takes
place on each market. Demand on the large markets is given by pi =2 0−qi −
300.5
P
j6=i qj.D e m a n do nt h es m a l lm a r k e ti sg i v e nb ypi =1 5−qi−0.8
P
j6=i qj.





It is easy to see that large markets are more pro￿table than the small market.
Furthermore, we claim that a network where the ￿rm on the small market
is linked to both ￿rms on large markets, but ￿rms on large markets are not
linked to another, is stable. To check this claim, notice that (i) the small
￿rm does not wish to sever its market sharing agreements with the large ￿rms:
πS(1) ≥ πS(2) + πL(3); (ii) the large ￿rms do not wish to severe their market
sharing agreement with the small ￿rm: πL(2) ≥ πS(2) + πL(3); and (iii) the
large ￿rms do not wish to sign a market sharing agreement with each other:
πL(1) < 2πL(2).
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzes the formation of market sharing agreements among ￿rms
in oligopolistic markets and procurement auctions. The set of market shar-
ing agreements de￿nes a collusive network, and the paper provides a complete
characterization of stable and eﬃcient collusive networks when ￿rms and mar-
kets are symmetric. Eﬃcient networks are regular networks, where ￿rms have
the same number of market sharing agreements. Stable networks are formed
of complete alliances, of diﬀerent sizes, larger than a minimal threshold. Typi-
cally, stable networks display fewer market sharing agreements than the optimal
network for the industry and more market sharing agreements than the socially
optimal network. When ￿rms or markets are asymmetric, incomplete alliances
can form in stable networks, and stable networks may be under-connected with
respect to the social optimum.
Our analysis sheds light on the recent wave of market sharing agreements in
the chemical and airline industries. We ￿nd that, in order to be stable, alliances
must reach a minimum size, and that an alliance grouping all ￿rms in the
31industry (as in the chemical industry) is more likely to be stable. When diﬀerent
alliances form (as in the airline industry), the market sharing agreements must
be complete ￿ all ￿rms in the alliance are linked by market sharing agreements
￿ and diﬀerent alliances must have diﬀerent sizes, with ￿rms in smaller alliances
free-riding on the formation of market sharing agreements by other ￿rms. Our
study also shows unambiguously that, in a symmetric setting, the formation
of market sharing alliances is harmful and should be corrected by an adequate
antitrust policy. On the other hand, when ￿rms face entry costs in foreign
markets, the formation of market sharing agreements may be bene￿cial, as it
helps to correct excessive entry of ￿rms into foreign markets.
While we believe that our analysis provides a useful application of recent
developments in the theory of economic networks to a concrete problem in in-
dustrial organization, we are aware of two important shortcomings of our study.
First, in order to keep the problem tractable and concentrate on the formation of
collusive networks, we assume that each ￿rm is originally associated to one mar-
ket. This assumption is reasonable in an international oligopoly setting, where
￿rms have a clearly speci￿ed home market, but is more diﬃcult to justify in pro-
curement auctions, where ￿rms are rarely specialized on one particular auction.
We believe that the thrust of our analysis remains unchanged if we assume that
there are more ￿rms than markets or more markets than ￿rms. However, the
exact characterization of pairwise stable collusive networks in these situations
poses new challenges and requires further study. Second, and most importantly,
we suppose that market sharing agreements are enforceable, without explicitly
modelling a dynamic framework of interaction. The analysis of the enforceabil-
ity of market sharing agreements seems to us to be a particularly promising
area of research. By forming market sharing agreements, ￿rms can choose the
number of markets on which they will compete, and hence endogenously deter-
mine the level of multimarket contact. We plan to tackle this issue by studying
the formation and enforceability of market sharing agreements in a repeated
interaction setting in future research.
326 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
We only consider the case of total pro￿ts. (A similar argument applies for social
welfare.) Let kP = N − nP. We distinguish between two cases.
(1) If NkP is even, by Lemma 2.2, there exists a regular network g of degree
kP. For this network,
P







i(T(ni(g0)) − T(nP) ≤ 0,a snP is
a maximizer of T(n).
(2) If now N and kP are odd, there is no regular network of degree kP.
Furthermore, as N and kP are both odd, kP 6= N − 1 and kP 6=0 ,s ot h e
function T(n) is neither monotonically decreasing nor increasing. As T(n) is









. In order to maximize T(n) on all








to one market. Hence, the eﬃcient network is an almost regular
network of degree (N − nP).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Consider a pairwise strong Nash equilibrium s∗. By Lemma 2.1, g(s∗) is a
pairwise stable network, and can be decomposed into complete components of
sizes greater than m∗. Suppose, by contradiction, that some component gl does
not satisfy the condition: π(N−m(gl)+1) ≥ π(N)+(m(gl)−1)π(N−m(gl)+2).
Then we claim that s∗ cannot be a Nash equilibrium, as any ￿rm i in gl has a
pro￿table deviation by choosing s0
i = ∅.
Conversely, suppose that the graph g can be decomposed into a set I of
isolated ￿rms and disjoint complete components g1,g 2,...,g L such that m(gl) 6=
m(gl0) ∀l 6= l0, and π(N −m(gl)+1)≥ π(N)+(m(gl)−1)π(N −m(gl)+2)∀l.
Consider the following strategies for the ￿rms: If ￿rm i belongs to a component
gl, it announces s∗
i = {j|j ∈ gl,j6= i}. If i is isolated, it announces s∗
i = ∅.W e
show that these strategies form a pairwise strong Nash equilibrium. Clearly,
no ￿rm i has an incentive to create a link to a ￿rm j in another component, as
i/ ∈ s∗
j. Furthermore, as m(gl) 6= m(gl0) ∀l 6= l0,n op a i ro f￿rms has an incentive
33to create an additional link. Now consider a ￿rm￿s incentive to destroy some
links. As π(N−m(gl)+1) ≥ π(N)+(m(gl)−1)π(N−m(gl)+2), the ￿rm cannot
bene￿t from destroying all its links. So suppose that it chooses to destroy links
t oas t r i c ts u b s e tJ of ￿rms in gl. This deviation would be pro￿table if and
only if
π(N − m(gl)+1 )< π(N − m(gl)+1+|J|)+|J|π(N − m(gl)+2 ) . (9)
Since |J| ≥ 1,w eh a v et h a t
π(N − m(gl)+|J| +1 )+|J|π(N − m(gl)+2 )≤ (|J| +1 )π(N − m(gl)+2 ) .
(10)
Furthermore, as J belong is a strict subset of ￿rms in gl, |J| <m (gl) − 1,a n d
|J| +1≤ m(gl) − 1.S o ,
(|J| +1 )π(N − m(gl)+2 )≤ (m(gl) − 1)π(N − m(gl)+2 ) . (11)
But then, combining (9), (10), and (11), we obtain π(N −m(gl)+1)< (m(gl)−
1)π(N − m(gl)+2 ) , contradicting our original condition.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1
As the other results are well-known, we concentrate on the proof of statement
(ii). Diﬀerentiating individual pro￿ts with respect to qi,w eo b t a i nt h e￿rst-
order condition:
P0(Q)qi + P(Q) − c0(qi)=0 .
As all ￿rms are identical, we write qi = qj = q ∀i,j,s ot h a t
P0(Q)q + P(Q) − c0(q)=0 . (12)
Treating n as a continuous variable and assuming linear costs, we obtain, by an










































































n8(1 + E(Q)+n)2 .
(15)
Using Equation (15), in order to show that π(n) is log-convex, it suﬃces to
establish











A(n)=Q2P0(Q)[2n3(1 + E(Q)+n)+n2(2n + E(Q))(2 + E(Q))




[n3(1 + E(Q)+n) − n3(2n + E(Q))]












E(Q)2 +( 2 n +1 )E(Q)+2 n2¢
].
By assumption, E0(Q) ≥ 0. Furthermore, E(Q)2+(2n +1 )E(Q)+2n2 > 0
∀n ≥ 2 and ∀E(Q). Hence, as P0(Q) < 0 we obtain
A(n)+n2(2n + E(Q))2Q2P0(Q) > 0,
showing that the pro￿t function π(n) is log-convex.
6.4 Iso-elastic Inverse Demand Function







The left inequality is immediately obtained: as T(1) >T (2). The right in-
equality is equivalent to log2 + logπ(3) − logπ(2) > 0, which can be rewritten
as






Immediate computations show that f00(α) > 0 and f0(0) = 3log2 − 2log3+
1/6 > 0.H e n c e f(α) is a strictly increasing function and, as f(0) = 0,w e
conclude that f(α) > 0 for all α ∈ (0,+∞). Hence, the only pairwise stable
networks are the empty and complete networks for a Cournot oligopoly with
isoelastic demand.
Turning now to pairwise strongly stable networks, de￿ne g(N)=π(N)+
(N − 1)π(2). The second derivative is given by g00(N)=π00(N).A s π is log-
convex, it is necessarily convex, so g00(N) > 0. Furthermore, evaluating g0(N)
at the lower bound N =2 ,w eo b t a i n
g0(2) = π0(2) + π(2) = α(1 + α)2
1−2α
α (2 + α)−1+2α
α > 0.
Hence g(N) is a strictly increasing function, and, if the complete network is
pairwise strongly stable for some N ≥ 3, π(1) ≥ π(3) + 2π(2). Furthermore, as





36We ￿nally show that inequality (16) is never satis￿ed. Rewriting it, we obtain:






It is easy to see that h00(α) > 0 and h0(0) = log5 − 3log2+0.5 > 0. Hence,
h(α) is an increasing function and, as h(0) = 0, inequality (16) can not be
satis￿ed for any value of α. W ec o n c l u d et h a tt h ec o m p l e t en e t w o r ki sn e v e r
pairwise strongly stable, and hence the only pairwise strongly stable network is
the empty network.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2
We concentrate again on the log-convexity of pro￿ts, as the other statements





log(1 − F(c))(1 − F(c))n−1F(c)dc < 0.




(log(1 − F(c))2(1 − F(c))n−1F(c)dc.
De￿ne p(c)=( 1− F(c))n−1F(c) and g(c)=−log(1 − F(c)). The function
p is ￿nite and strictly positive over (0,C) and the function g is ￿nite and
nonnegative over the same set. Hence, we may de￿ne, as in Hardy, Littlewood








By a generalization of Schwartz￿s inequality (Theorem 192, p. 143 in Hardy,
Littlewood and Polya, 1952), if r<s ,
Mr(g,p) < Ms(g,p)









37Replacing p and g with their expressions:
￿Z C
0








(log(1 − F(c))2(1 − F(c))n−1F(c)dc.
Hence
π0(n)2 < π(n)π00(n),
showing that individual pro￿ts are strictly log-convex in n.
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